



IRES, Universit´ e catholique de Louvain
September 16, 2004
Abstract
This paper provides the ﬁrst political economy model in which
self-interested natives decide when voting rights should be granted
to foreign-born workers. This choice is driven by the maximization
of the net gains from immigration. We focus on the provision of a
public good: immigrants could enlarge the tax base by increasing the
total workforce, but at the same time they inﬂuence the tax rate by
eventually exerting their political rights.
We ﬁnd that the quantity and the quality (human capital) of per-
spective immigrants, the political composition of the native popula-
tion, and the sensitivity of the migration choice to voting rights, are
all decisive factors in determining the political choice over the optimal
timing of naturalization.
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11 Introduction
According to the OECD’s (2001) report on international migrations, devel-
oped countries maintain relevant diﬀerences in their immigration policies,
and mostly in their naturalization policies.
By ”naturalization policy” we essentially refer to the requirements that
foreign-born workers are supposed to meet in order to apply for, and obtain
full citizenship. Among these requirements the most important is probably
represented by the number of years spent in the host country1, which goes
(see Table 1) from a minimum of 3 (Netherlands, Australia, Canada) to a
maximum 12 (Switzerland). Some additional features are often required: for
instance, to acquire U.S. citizenship it is also needed to show proﬁciency in
English and some knowledge of American history. This could indeed sug-
gest that behind the concession of citizenship there is a strong concern for
assimilation and integration, and the reluctance in granting political rights
to immigrants may be due to the fear of a possible ”distortion” of the polit-
ical process as a consequence of foreigners’ diﬀerent preferences, tastes and
political sensitivity.
It’s worth noting that the acquisition of citizenship (naturalization tout-
court) is a suﬃcient but not necessary condition to obtain voting rights. In
fact, several countries allow legal immigrants without citizenship to partic-
ipate to the political decision process, at least at an administrative (local)
level. Once more, we ﬁnd a minimum number of years of residency to be
the main requirement in this respect, and we observe that OECD countries
adopt very diﬀerent policies (see Table 2). In the cases of United Kingdom
and Spain we can notice that ”cultural aﬃnity” may favor the concession of
voting rights.
There is much ongoing debate on this issue of granting voting rights to
immigrants without citizenship (let us call it ”political naturalization”). At
an institutional level we can register a progressively more permissive orien-
1However, in most cases, getting married with a native entitles by itself to gain citi-
zenship.




Austria 10 years (Vienna: 4-5 years)





Germany 8 years (before 2000: 15 years)
Italy 10 years (before 1992: 5 years)
Luxembourg 10 years




Switzerland 12 years + many additional requirements
U.S. 5 years + proﬁciency in English + American history
tation: in 1998 a resolution of the European Parliament recommended to
its member states the concession of voting rights to legal immigrants who
are resident from at least 5 years2, while in 2003 the same institution has
suggested to consider a threshold of 3 years3.
Moreover, we would underline that immigrants are often easily entitled
to social beneﬁts, while the reluctance of national governments to give them
voting rights is not signiﬁcantly decreasing over time. Once we take into
account that an optimally limited number of immigrants could be an as-
2The text adopted by the Parliament is based on the 1996 Annual Report of the Com-
mittee on Civil Liberties and Internal Aﬀairs, according to which: ”... the principle of
equality of treatment (must) be recognized, both as regards economic and social rights and
civil and political rights, including the recognition of voting rights in local and European
elections for all foreigners without discrimination, whether they are subjects of Member
States or third countries, providing they have been residing in the host country for over
ﬁve years. A Council of Europe Convention has requested this since 1992, but few Member
States have applied this provision”.
3The text of Recommendation 1625 urges the Committee of Ministers ”...to call on
member states to grant immigrants who have been legally living in the country for at least
three years the right to vote and stand in local elections and encourage activities to foster
their active political participation”.
3Table 2: Available OECD countries: conditions to vote without citizenship.
country conditions
Austria never, by constitution
Denmark 3 years
France never, by constitution
Germany never, by constitution
the Netherlands 5 years
Norway 3 years
Portugal 3 years
Spain 0 years (for Latino-Americans)
Sweden 3 years
Switzerland 10 years (Neuchatel)
U.K. 0 years (for people from the Commonwealth and Ireland
set, more than a liability, for the welfare state (see for instance Storesletten,
2000), we could be tempted to resort to two explanations: (i) the concession
of voting rights is a more suitable policy tool (than imposing immigration
quotas, for instance) in order to regulate immigration inﬂows, (ii) the het-
erogeneity of immigrants’ preferences regarding public decision-making is a
crucial concern of natives when they have to legislate about naturalization
policies.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no model in the literature on the
endogenous determination of naturalization policies. One possible exception
is represented by Cukierman et al. (1993), whose model points out that
political preferences of immigrants are correlated with their ”immigration
vintage”, and then a political conﬂict may arise between new and old im-
migrants, leading to an ever-lasting delay in the concession of voting rights.
However, they don’t reach any positive conclusion about the optimal tim-
ing of naturalization. As for the rest, even the quite developed literature
on the political economy of immigration (see for instance Benhabib, 1996)
neglects the problem of naturalization and voting rights concession. Michel
et al. (1998) underline the need for ﬁlling this gap, and the present paper
goes exactly in this direction.
Our model assumes that, before that immigration takes places, the native
population of a developed country decides when future immigrants should be
4granted the right to vote, knowing that immigrants may eventually use this
right to intervene in a voting process over the provision of a public good.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and solves the basic
model. Section 3 analyzes the robustness of our theory to the change of the
voting mechanism. A concluding discussion is then supplied in Section 4.
2 The model
The model we propose can be thought of as the description of a two-stage
policy game.
In the ﬁrst stage, which is immediately anterior to immigration, native
voters choose the naturalization policy (let’s say the number of years that
immigrants should reside in the country before being granted the right to
vote).
In the second, which could actually involve many repeated voting events,
both natives and naturalized immigrants decide each year over the optimal
provision of a public good, that we assume not to enter the utility function
of foreign born workers.
We assume that the ﬁrst collective decision is taken through majority vot-
ing, while for the second stage we adopt a setting with probabilistic voting.
The reason is essentially that we see voting on political rights as a typi-
cal ”referendum” issue which undergoes majority voting. On the other side
voting on the public good provision is more likely to be regulated through
probabilistic voting, with governments being concerned about a utilitarian
social welfare function and the individuation of the swing voter (rather than
the median voter). In addition, we want to underline that even if we ab-
stract from the issue of realism, dealing with probabilistic voting on both
issues would have led to heavy analytical complications, while the case of
”double” majority voting (which we describe later in the paper) would pro-
duce qualitatively the same results, but with less rich implications and with
a consistent loss of smoothness for the model.
52.1 The basic setup
We start by considering our toy economy as being in autarky, i.e. without
any migration inﬂow.
Let’s assume that the home economy is composed by two diﬀerent groups
of individuals. The only source of heterogeneity is represented by diﬀerent
preferences regarding a public (or publicly provided good) g.
The ﬁrst group is assumed to be of size L and to have the following
preferences:
uL = c + γ log(1 + g), (1)
while the second group (of dimension Z) does not take any utility from
the consumption of g, so that:
uZ = c. (2)
This characterization of diﬀerent tastes for the public good is not new in
the literature: it is rather close to what we ﬁnd, for instance, in Bisin and
Verdier (2000).
In this stylized economy everybody is endowed with one unit of labor
whose retribution is ﬁxed at its constant marginal productivity w.
The production of the public good is ﬁnanced through a proportional
income tax levied at the rate a, so that:
c = (1 − a)w (3)
and
g = aw(L + Z). (4)
We should now explain how a is determined as an outcome of the political
process. We opt for a probabilistic voting; a is chosen to maximize the
following objective function:
6W = LuL + ZuZ = L{(1 − a)w + γ log[1 + aw(L + Z)]} + Z(1 − a)w. (5)
In fact, probabilistic voting is presented here in its simplest form (the
two groups have identical political power, so that only their relative size
matters), and then boils down to the maximization of a utilitarian social
welfare function (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000).
















every time that this voting process takes place.




[1 + aw(L + Z)]2
is always negative. Moreover, a∗ is positive provided that γ > 1/L: we
will assume this inequality to holds throughout the remainder of the paper.
2.2 Introducing migration
Let’s now add migration to our framework.
We start by supposing that M immigrants may, at a given moment, join
our economy and that they are characterized by uM = uZ. This assumption
qualiﬁes g as a sort of ”national” (or even ”patriotic” public good), whose
supply native workers are far more concerned about. It seems then natural
to assume L > Z.
We mean that the taste for the consumption of such a good (or a peculiar
quality of some public good) is highly aﬀected by sharing the values and tra-
dition of a community, and developed by living in a given country. Examples
can be found thinking to some features of the French educational system
(namely its strong and widely shared laicism), to the ﬁnancial support that
7the Italian state still gives to the activity of the Catholic Church, or to the
high share of public expenditure that the United States devote to defense
issues. Immigrants are not likely to express the same kind of preferences4.
With respect to native workers, they have the same time endowment
(entirely devoted to work), but diﬀerent productivity (h  = 1). How is the
voting process altered by the participation of immigrants?
Foreign workers matter in two respects. First, they contribute according
to their labor productivity to the production activity, and ﬁnance as tax-
payers the provision of the public good. Second, they may intervene in the
decision process, but of course only once they are allowed to vote.
As long as voting rights are denied to immigrants, we have that (5) be-
comes:
W = LuL+ZuZ = L{(1−a)w+γ log[1+aw(L+Z+hM)]}+Z(1−a)w, (7)
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. (8)
If immigrants can vote (with or without having acquired citizenship), the
objective function transforms into:
W = LuL+(Z+M)uZ = L{(1−a)w+γ log[1+aw(L+Z+hM)]}+(Z+M)(1−a)w,
(9)
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. (10)
4A decent knowledge of American history is one of the requirements that have to be
met to be granted U.S. citizenship: it’s hard not to recognize behind that an attempt to
develop migrant’s sensitivity to America’s common values and tradition
8It is easy to check that a∨ < a∗ < a◦.
Let us also underline how immigrant’s participation to the production
activity depends on their productivity (it is weighted by h), while their par-
ticipation to the voting process is weighted by 15.
With an exogenously ﬁxed number M of immigrants, it is clear that L-
type natives would always prevent them from acquiring political rights, while
the Z-type group would favor quickest naturalization.
For sake of realism we want now to make M depend on τ, where τ deﬁnes
the ”residence requirement”, i.e. the minimum number of years the foreign
worker needs to have been resident in the host country before applying for and
obtaining voting rights (with or without citizenship). Suppose in fact that
at time 0 there are m prospective migrants to our country, i.e. m individuals
that, on a pure economic ground (higher wages), would be interested in
working and living in that country. We can think that their decision would
also be aﬀected by other factors, for instance by the quality of citizenship
and by the political status they could earn abroad: ceteris paribus a country
which oﬀers earlier and wider political participation would be more likely to
be elected as one’s migration country.
To be more precise, suppose that only permanent migration has to be
considered, and let’s ﬁx to T years the residual working life of a prospective
migrant. Voting rights are granted after τ years of residence in the foreign
country. In this framework, actual migration can be thought to obey to the
following law:




with 0 < σ < 1 and 0 < τ < T.
5This is not unquestionable; Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) supply several explana-
tions according to which political participation could indeed be positively correlated with
human capital. However, for our results to hold it is enough to assume that immigrants
weigh more as voter than as workers.
9The parameter σ determines how much sensitive the migration decision is
to the voting rights issue: for σ = 0 migration will take place regardless of the
political status oﬀered abroad; in general a low value of σ could correspond
to the case of extremely high foreign wages, so high that the issue of political
status becomes of minor importance6. For 0 < σ < 1 we can see that the
higher is τ (the later voting is allowed), the smaller will be the number of
actual migrants.
By ﬁxing the migration law as above we introduce a trade-oﬀ linked to
τ, from the point of view of L-type voters. In fact an earlier concession of
voting rights means more foreign workers in the home economy, and by this
a larger collectible tax base to ﬁnance the production of the g good. On the
other side, a low value for τ implies that the immigrants intervene for a larger
number of years in the voting process, thus determining an a which will be
for many times diﬀerent from the ideal value supported by L-type natives,
and more diﬀerent the larger the number of immigrants.
2.3 Voting over the residence time requirement τ
At this point we need to characterize the voting procedure over τ.
First of all we assume that the M immigrants are all of the same age,
and that this age corresponds to the minimum age to be eligible for voting.
It seems to us that it is not unrealistic to suppose that immigrants are quite
young when they reach the host country.
As for the L + Z native workers and voters, we assume that they are
distributed in T diﬀerent cohorts, and that each cohort is composed by l+z
individuals, where l = L/T and z = Z/T. In other words, we are assuming
that the native population does not exhibit any kind of demographic growth,
and that the distribution of preferences does not undergo any evolution over
6Low values of σ could be also explained by the presence of a large national community
in the foreign country (like in the case of Turkish immigrants in Germany), or by a heavy
convenience to work in a country that speaks the same language.
10generations.
The collective choice over τ will take place once for all exactly before
the immigrants’ cohort arrives in the home economy7, and it will be oper-
ated through majority voting, so that we search for the median voter in the
”autarkic” economy.
Every native (and perfect-foresighted) voter will support the value of τ
which maximizes her lifetime utility, i.e.:
Ui,j(τ) = τui(a
◦(τ)) + (T − j − τ)ui(a
∨(τ)) (12)
where i denotes preferences (i = L,Z) and j identiﬁes the cohort (0 ≤ j ≤
T). For simplicity and without any change in the results we have preferred
not to introduce any time discounting.
Regardless of their age, all the Z-type natives will vote in favor of an
immediate concession of voting rights to the immigrants. In fact, new voters
with their same preferences will help Z-type workers to obtain a better (from
their point of view) tax rate, and this gain will be proportional to M, thus
it will be higher the lower τ.
Since we have assumed L > Z, we can turn to L-type natives and search
inside this category for the median voter.






τuL(a◦(τ)) + (T − j − τ)uL(a∨(τ)) if τ < T − j (a)
(T − j)uL(a◦(τ)) if τ ≥ T − j (b)
(13)
where a◦ and a∨ are as in (8) and (10).
The second part of equation (13) writes this way because if τ ≥ T − j
the native worker belonging to the j-th cohort will never be faced with an
7To avoid complications in the analysis, we prefer to assume that τ will be never re-
voted after immigration.
11a chosen with the participation of the immigrants, so that the second half
of (13a) disappears; as for the ﬁrst part, whatever τ, it will always involve
T − j years, with τ only aﬀecting a◦ as in (8).
We can claim what follows.
Proposition 1 Each cohort j of L-type native voters has single-peaked pref-
erences over τ.
Proof.
Proving Proposition 1 coincides with proving that (13) has a unique max-
imum for 0 < τ < T. It can be easily done.
In fact it can be shown that (13a) is concave in τ and (13b) is mono-
tonically decreasing in τ, while they get the same value for τ = T − j (see
Appendix A for these results). It follows that the situation may be depicted
as in Figure 1: either the two functions cross before the bliss point of (13a)
or they cross after. In both cases a maximum of (13) as a whole exists: it is
either attained for τ = T − j (upper part of Figure 1) or corresponds to the
maximum of (13a) (lower part). ⊓
Given the single-peakedness of preferences of L-type voters, so that for
each cohort j we can identify a unique utility-maximizing value for τ (let’s
call it τ∗
j , we are ensured that there also exists one value τ⋄ of τ which is
chosen through majority voting (among the diﬀerent τ∗
j ’s supported by the
diﬀerent cohorts).
Let’s now recall an important feature of the voting process, namely that
we assumed L > Z; this implies that the median voter belongs to one of the
T cohorts of L-type natives. But which cohort, exactly?
Assuming that τ∗
j > 0 for each j, we are interested in establishing how τ∗
j
depends on j. It can be shown that:
Proposition 2 For suﬃciently high values of h, the function τ∗
j = f(j) is
non-monotone, and more precisely it is ∩-shaped. In other words: there exist
a ˆ j such that τ∗
j = f(j) is increasing for 0 ≤ j < ˆ j and decreasing for
ˆ j < j ≤ T.
12Figure 1: Lifetime utility
Proof.
This proposition comes as a combination of two results. First, we have
that, as long as (13b) crosses (13a) after having reached its maximum, τ∗
j =
f(j) is monotonically increasing if h is not too low (by Implicit Function
Theorem, see Appendix). On the other hand, going beyond a critical value
of j it happens that (13b) crosses (13a) at the left of its bliss point; by
consequence τ∗
j = T − j, which is decreasing in j. ⊓
Therefore, the oldest among the L-type citizens will support the lowest
(yet positive) values of τ, the young will support higher τ’s, while the highest
values will be proposed by the middle-aged.
For sake of simplicity (and without loss of realism) we want to rule out the
possibility that the median voter will be among the ones for whom τ∗
j = T−j,
so that we are able to claim what follows:




The proof, obtained by means of the Implicit Function Theorem, is shown
in Appendix B.
Moreover, if we abstract from productivity diﬀerences between native and
foreign workers, assuming h = 1, we can state the following:




∂q > 0 if (L − Z) → 0; otherwise, if (L − Z) → L, then there exists
a value ˆ q of q = m
L such that: (i) for 0 < q < ˆ q, ∂τ⋄
∂q < 0 , and (ii) for
ˆ q < q < 1, ∂τ⋄
∂q > 0.
Proof.
As above, see the Appendix.
Proposition 3 tells us that the attitude of L-type natives toward the con-
cession of voting rights to immigrants is more favorable if foreign workers
are relatively high-skilled. The explication is that, with h improving, foreign
workers contribute more to production, while their impact on the voting
process about g does not increase.
Proposition 4 explains that naturalization is also likely to occur earlier
when σ is high, i.e. when the decision to migrate is highly sensitive to the
quality of the citizenship that is oﬀered by the host country. In such a case
τ becomes a more powerful policy tool, so that it will used more ”carefully”.
Furthermore, the second part of the same Proposition gives us some infor-
mation about the interaction between the size of potential immigration and
the political composition of the native population in the determination of τ⋄.
In fact we see that, with a very narrow numerical advantage of L-type natives
over Z-type ones, any increase in the ratio between potential immigrants and
total native population (q) will result ceteris paribus in a higher value of τ⋄,
since the future impact of immigrants in the political process is expected to
14be decisive, due to the narrow gap which exists between national groups. On
the other hand, if the L-type group has a wide pre-immigration majority, we
will have that ∂τ⋄
∂q > 0 only if q is quite large8. This makes sense and depends
on the fact that if immigrants are ”too many” relatively to the number of
L-type natives, they are likely to alter signiﬁcantly the political outcome in
favor of Z-type natives, and the median voter (belonging to the L-group) will
react choosing a more ”hostile” assimilation policy, i.e. a higher τ⋄.
3 Majority voting over both a and τ
Here we want to show that our results hold qualitatively unchanged if we
assume that both policy decisions (respectively about a and τ) take place by
means of a majority voting procedure.
In autarky, if L > Z, the chosen value for a corresponds to the value that















If the Z-voters were the majority we would have aA = aZA = 0.




γ(L + Z + hM) − 1







(L + Z + hM)
 
, (15)
both when the M immigrants don’t vote and when they are not numerous
enough to form a majority with the Z-type natives (so that L > Z + M).
Once immigrants are allowed to vote, and in case they will form a majority
with the Z-type natives (so that Z +M > L), they will be able to determine
aM = 0.
8Switzerland in the 70’s could be a good example of a high q.
15Let’s now turn to the voting process over τ and keep unchanged the
assumptions we made in the previous section (especially that L > Z).
The median voter will be a L-type native.






τuL(aLM(τ)) + (T − j − τ)uL(0) if τ < min(T − j,T
(m+Z−L)
σm ) (a)




In (16a) we have written the expression for lifetime utility in the case
of a migration inﬂow that is large enough to make a minority of the L-




If τ > ˆ τ, the late concession of voting rights will cause a limited immi-
gration to take place, and the L-type voter will see her most preferred a to
prevail in each one of her T − j residual years of life, so that her lifetime
utility is as in (16b).
In addition we need also to take into account that this switch from (16a)
to (16b) may happen for lower values of τ, and it is the case of old voters for
whom τ > T − j.
Thus, L-voters’ preferences are single-peaked (see Figure 2). The resulting
optimal value of τ (τ∗) can be either T
(m+Z−L)
σm or T − j, the latter being a
sort of ”corner” solution for older people.
We can see that the situation reproduces what we have described in Sec-
tion 2.
Moreover, if we forget about the corner solution and focus on τ∗ =
T
(m+Z−L)
σm , we can easily see that, in strong analogy with the case of proba-
bilistic voting over a, we get that: ∂τ⋄
∂σ < 0, ∂τ⋄
∂q > 0, ∂τ⋄
∂L < 0 , ∂τ⋄
∂m > 0 and
∂τ⋄
∂Z > 0.
16Figure 2: Lifetime utility when a is decided through majority voting
The unpleasant property of this setting with double majority voting is
that τ∗ turns out to be a sort of ”bang-bang” solution: in fact τ∗ can be
chosen to be either equal to T − j or to ˆ τ. Thus this speciﬁcation does not
display any smoothness.
We can also observe that natives will set assimilation policies that will
encourage immigrants to join the developed economy up to the point when
they are numerous enough to overturn the existing political majority (leading
to a sort of ”razor’s edge” situation).
Moreover, given that the actual size of migration inﬂows are far from
being able to revert the political majority on whatever national public good,
one would expect natives not to fear anything from granting political rights
to foreign born workers.
On the contrary, probabilistic voting has the nice and more realistic prop-
17erty that immigrants could aﬀect the political outcome even being a minority.
In addition, it allows us to establish some further results, like the impact of
immigrant’s productivity (skills) on τ⋄.
4 Conclusions
Far from being exhaustive, our model has provided a framework of analysis
useful to shed some light on the economic motivations that may hide behind
the naturalization policies put in place by developed countries.
Focusing in particular on the number of years a legal immigrant should
wait before obtaining either political or full naturalization, we have shown
that this variable can be determined as an outcome of majority voting, and it
depends on the concern, by (the majority of) the native population, about the
inﬂuence that immigrants could exert on the provision of a ’national’ public
good, decided by means of probabilistic voting. ”Diﬀerent preferences” is
the key concept in explaining the delay in the concession of voting rights
to foreign workers. This delay can be relatively short if immigrants are
fairly well skilled and if the migration choice is quite sensitive to the issue of
political participation, while it is likely to be longer the larger the relative
size of prospective immigration.
A natural and interesting extension of our work would consist in taking
into account the possibility of an endogenous assimilation of immigrants. In
other words, by sharing the same social and cultural environment of native
citizens, immigrants may change their preferences, developing an increasing
taste for the ”national” values and traditions of the host country. The work-
ing of this assimilation process may be expected to inﬂuence the setting of
naturalization policies.
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A Derivation of some analytical results used
in the Proofs of Propositions 1 and 2
Here we want to supply some analytical derivations that lie at the basis of
some of the main results we referred to in Section 2.
19Function (13a) is strictly concave in τ.




γ[m(T − στ) + TZ][−2TZ + m(σT − 2T − σj + στ) + LT(−2TZ + mσj − 2mT − σmT + 3σmτ)]





h2m(j − T)σ[Tγ(L + Z + hm) − 2T − hmγστ]
[T(L + Z + hm) − hmστ]3
 
which is always negative for τ < T − j, provided that γ > 1/L and that
T,L,m and Z are all larger than one.
Function (13b) is strictly decreasing in τ.
Its ﬁrst derivative w.r.t. τ is:
hm(j − T)σ {T[(L + Z + hm)γ − 1] − γhmστ}
[T(L + Z + hm) − hmστ]2 ,
and it is always negative under the same conditions as above.
Provided that h is not too low, the function τ∗(j) (maximizer of (13a)) is
monotonically increasing in j.
Or better:
There exists a h such that, for every h > h the function τ∗(j) is mono-
tonically increasing in j.














This expression is always positive if we can ensure that the denominator







mγσ[m(T − στ) + ZT]
[m(T − στ) + (L + Z)T]2







[m(T − στ) + (L + Z)T]2
20is always positive, we can conclude that there exists a h such that, for
h < h < 1, U′
j(τ,j) > 0, thus establishing what we claimed above (and that
is what we meant by saying ”provided that h is not too low”).
Moreover, the positiveness of the denominator of (17) is granted under
the following suﬃcient condition that does not depend on τ:
h >
1 − (L + Z)γ +
 
4m(m + Z)γ2 + [γ(L + Z) − 1]2
2mγ
.
B Proofs of Propositions 3 and 4
Both Propositions 3 and 4 stated some results about the eﬀects of the pa-
rameters on τ⋄, under the assumption that the median voter was among the
ones with τ∗ < T − j.
Thus, to prove that ∂τ⋄
∂h < 0, we simply need to prove that ∂τ∗
∂h < 0.












We already know that the numerator is always positive for τ < T −j (see
Appendix A). As for the denominator, it is easy to check that it is always
negative. By consequence, the fraction as a whole is negative.
Then, we turn to the sign of ∂τ⋄
∂σ .





σ(τ,σ) depends on the conﬁguration of the parameters and cannot
be established in advance. However, since we are mostly interested in un-
derstanding what happens for high enough values of h (see Proposition 2),






m(T − j)(γL − 1)
T(L + m + Z)2 ;
21since it is always negative, we can say that ∂τ⋄
∂σ < 0, for low values of τ
(as claimed in Proposition 3).
We now look at the sign of ∂τ⋄
∂q .













q(1 + q)γLT − σ(1 − q)γL(T − j)
LT(1 + q)3 .
The ﬁrst limit is always positive, and then we can conclude that, provided
that the diﬀerence in size between L and Z is small enough, ∂τ⋄
∂q is positive
for low values of τ (as stated in Proposition 3: in fact a weak majority is
likely to induce restrictive policies).
The sign of the second limit depends on q: in particular, the numerator
is a quadratic function of q. Since the whole fraction assumes the values of
−
σ(T−j)(γL−1)
LT < 0 and
γ
4 > 0 respectively in correspondence of q = 0 and
q = 1, we can conclude that:
∃ˆ q : (i) for 0 < q < ˆ q, ∂τ⋄
∂q < 0 , and (ii) for ˆ q < q < 1, ∂τ⋄
∂q > 0.
22